The US-Russia relations are entering a new political season in a shape which is far from being perfect. The "reset" is over, and throughout the years 2011 and especially 2012 the relations have worsened again. Political leadership of both countries is irritated and disappointed with each other. Unlike the last four years, neither Russia nor the US will invest much political capital in their relations improvement, and their relative priority will decrease in both countries' foreign policies. The share of contradictions in the relations surpasses that of positive cooperation again. Yet, the paper argues, a new worsening of the US-Russia relations or their new stagnation over the next years is in neither side's interests. The US and Russia still do have an important positive agenda to work on, which is crucial for both sides' vital national interests. It includes, above all, Afghanistan and the Asia Pacific. The major impediment of progress on both dimensions, the author claims, will be in the near-and middle term future a lack of political will on both sides to move the relations forward.
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A New Negative Cycle
One of the fundamental features of the US-Russia relations since the end of the Cold War has been its cycle nature.
2 Every new attempt to build sustainable partnership failed to be followed The degradation periods were marked by stagnating positive agenda and growing share of the negative one, gradual movement of the relations center of political gravity to the latter, as well as slow but steady deterioration of political atmosphere. However, each time the sides were trying to preserve at least an impression that the general paradigm and overall logic of the relations were still positive. During both 2 nd Clinton-Yeltsin and 2 nd Bush-Putin terms the sides were keeping and even expanding areas of cooperation, which did not compensate for the agenda gradually becoming overwhelmed with contradictions. They were also officially describing the US-Russia relations as "partnership" and emphasizing their continuity, which did not compensate for rising mutual irritation, distrust and even hostility. 4 This is exactly the pattern the US-Russia relations might follow in the next 3-4 years unless some decisive step is taken by both Moscow and Washington to destroy this negative cycle.
Selective cooperation on some issues, where such cooperation suits the sides' national interests, would coincide with confrontation on the other and with a growing number of contradictions and quarrels. Eventually the latter would seem so important for the sides' reading of their national interests, that they would overwhelm and perhaps even destroy the former. The mood in both capitals regarding the prospects for the US-Russia relations is quite reminiscent of those existed in 2004 and even 1996, which is that of distrust and mutual irritation, despite the fact that the international environment and even many crucial elements of the US-Russia relations themselves changed fundamentally.
The year 2012 manifested a turning point for the US-Russia relation. Their gradual positive development during the previous three years, labeled by many as the "reset", finally came into crisis. 5 One again mutual discouragement, alienation and negative political atmosphere started to get an upper hand in the relations. After a short period of modest improvement by the summer 2012, thus overcoming little by little a negative impact of the Russian Presidential election, the political atmosphere of the relations started to deteriorate again by the end of the year. The USRussia relations agenda by the end of 2013 -beginning of 2013 again started to be overwhelmed by contradictions and irritants, while an explicit lack of political will on both sides impedes their serious exploration and development of a new positive agenda.
In a nutshell, the year 2012 manifested that the US-Russia relations are again trapped by the negative cycles logic, and that they are in a midst of a new cycle from their gradual and dynamic improvement of the years 2009-2010 to a new stagnation and, quite possibly, a new degradation and eventual deterioration crisis, which might take place in 4-5 years. This means that the "reset" The fact that despite all these positive prerequisites the US and Russia failed to build sustainable partnership and the negative cycle of their relations is being repeated again, means that these 7 relations are systemically defective. Unless this defect is eliminated, the negative cycles of the relations will repeat themselves. This defect consists of three components.
First, it is a lack or deficit of a new positive agenda in the US-Russian relations, the one which would correspond to the objective challenges and opportunities that they face in the rapidly and constantly changing international environment. Indeed, the US-Russia agenda lacks a strategic dialogue on China and the Asia Pacific, on managing nuclear multipolarity, on developing Siberia and the Far East, and even on Afghanistan and the Central Asian region beyond 2014
(after the US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan).
Second, it is the continuous domination of the strategic deterrence philosophy in the US-Russia relations and its remaining to be their political imperative for both sides, and especially to Russia. Indeed, both Washington and especially Moscow are still committed to the parity principle in the nuclear arms field, and view it as a prerequisite of their military security. As a result, they are very sensitive and suspicious to any steps of each other, which could hypothetically impact not simply vulnerability of the opposite side and their capacity to deter it from hostile behavior and especially direct use of force against each other, but which could undermine their current "balance of terror", the current levels of deterrence. This undermines trust and forces the sides to plan against each other and counterbalance each other. Obviously, preservation of the deterrence and counterbalancing philosophy impedes the sides from resolving the current contradictions, especially in the military and defense area, as well as from creating and implementing a new positive agenda, including the one in the strategic defense area.
Third, it is the backward nature of the current US-Russia relations agenda, especially in the security realm, its mismatch with the objective needs of the sides in security and foreign policy areas. This relates in particular to the role of arms control in the US-Russia relations, which remains to occupy a central place in their agenda despite the fact that it is no longer central for either objective security needs and challenges of Russia and the US, nor for real matters of regional and international security. Sovietization of the Commonwealth of Independent States), and were largely generated by the U.S. domestic policy.
Moscow was particularly irritated at the Magnitsky Act, which was mainly meant to make an unfriendly gesture at Russia, demonstratively underscore the United States' critical attitude to the A combination of these factors must have produced a "screw breaking" effect on the Russian leadership. It enhanced the feeling of unfriendliness, even hostility towards America, and might have generated the impression that, contrary to forecasts, the Obama administration would not pursue a friendlier and more well-disposed policy towards Russia during the second term. For instance, the US-Russia cooperation on Afghanistan, which is today the central pillar of their positive cooperative agenda, was intensified. In particular, a transit center in the Russian city of Ulyanovsk was created to intensify the transit of non-lethal goods for the ISAF needs to Afghanistan and back; the "return transit" from Afghanistan through the Russian territoryessential at a time of the US and ISAF withdrawal from the country -was launched; the US continued to buy the Russian military equipment and arms for the Afghan Armed Forces, including helicopters; counter-narcotics cooperation was moving on, etc. Moreover, the Obama Administration has already indicated that it will refuse to implement the Congress-adopted "ban" on Pentagon's future purchases of the Russian helicopters by resorting to the "national security regime. Again, this happened due to intensive and difficult work of the Obama Administration, which had to overcome substantial opposition on the part of Republicans.
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Last but not least, the sides launched a number of concrete important and prospective commercial projects, among the most ambitious among which is the "strategic partnership"
between the Russian state energy corporation Rosneft and the US energy giant Exxon Mobile.
The relevant agreement was signed between the companies in 2011, and since then its implementation has been quite dynamic. Notably, their cooperation involves joint research and exploitation of resources in such politicized regions, as the Arctic shelf, swaps of assets (which is unprecedented for the US-Russian economic and especially energy cooperation), and other forms.
If successful and sustainable, the Rosneft -Exxon Mobile cooperation could become a game changer in the Russian-US energy and economic relation. First, it could reduce excessive politization and securitization of the Arctic energy resources theme and show that mutually beneficial cooperation here between Russia and the US, which have traditionally been perceived and claimed as natural rivals in the region, is possible and desirable. Second, it would prove the desirability and possibility of a US-Russia energy cooperation, which also is traditionally viewed as highly unlikely, whereas the dominant feature of the sides' relations in the fossil fuels field has been confrontation, especially in the Eurasian context. Third, it could pave the way for emergence of the US-Russia economic interdependence in the future.
Scenarios for the Future Scenario No 1: Pragmatic and selective cooperation
Combination of the described above positive and negative factors provides for two likely scenarios for the US-Russia relations development in the near and middle-term future.
The first would be the relations acquiring essentially pragmatic and instrumentalist nature. In this case the US-Russia relations would become less ambitious, ideological and strategic, but more instrumental and tactical. Maximalist visions of the relations will be taken over by pragmatic collaboration on concrete project when desirable, feasible and politically beneficial, whereas political leadership of both countries decline even to talk about their strategic goal and desired sustainable shape. Negative linkages between different components of the US-Russia agenda would be weakening to the relations benefit. Moscow and Washington would continue combining cooperation on one set of issues with competition and confrontation on the other, with the latter not undermining and blocking the former, even if the latter, not the former, constitute the majority of the relations.
Indeed, the current US-Russia contradictions on Syria, missile defense and Magnitsky Act do not hamper their cooperation on Afghanistan or joint exploitation of the Arctic resources. Whereas the political atmosphere of relations would remain rather lean and restrained, without excessive emotions to either direction. The relations would lack strategic goal and desirable shape, and the political establishments of the countries would decline to provide the US-Russia relations with labels and assessments, such as "partnership", "friendship", "alliance" or "hostility". The sides would simply cooperate when they can and find it beneficial, and compete and confront, when their immediate reading of their national interests require.
As neither Russia nor the US are interested in comprehensive deterioration of their relations, as both are sustaining cooperation on a selected list of issues, and, finally, as full-fledged partnership seems very unlikely given the current deterioration of the political climate of the relations and their "mini-crisis" of 2012, this pragmatist model appears to be both likely and even desirable for the next several years.
It looks like that the policy of the Obama Administration towards Russia is already evolving in this way, emphasizing pragmatism and selective cooperation on converging interests, while downplaying emotions and the value-driven agenda. Indeed, Washington is persistently emphasizing importance to cooperate with Russian on such issues as Afghanistan, Syria and nuclear materials. At the same time, its reaction to the developments of the Russian domestic politics and to some Russian critical public statements in relation to the US, accusing America itself in gross violation of human rights and democratic principles, remains remarkably and unprecedented mild and restrained. Moreover, the Obama Administration is itself downplaying and degrading the value-driven agenda with Russia, which historically has been central to the US foreign policy agenda.
Witness, for instance, the US decision in January 2013 to withdraw from the Civil Society Working Group of the Bilateral Presidential Committee. This step depicts that the US is regarding Russia as a fundamentally alien player in terms of values. However, this official and vivid alienation does not prevent it to cooperate with Moscow on many things.
This is exactly the model that Russia has been insisting on with Washington for many years already. Readiness of the Obama Administration to accept it highlights a crucial transformation of the US foreign policy in general, its de-ideologization and adjustment to an increasingly multipolar and "Post-American" world. Another example of the US readiness to accept the "Russian" rules of the game, i.a. the principles of parity and equality, on those issues on the USRussia agenda, which according to Russia reflect the "paradigm of the 1990s" in the US-Russia relations. Among them are the Nunn-Lugar program on elderly and excessive weapons and nuclear material utilization and USAID expel from Russia. Indeed, these programs and projects were designed at a time when Russia was weak and declining, while the US seemed all-mighty, and thus were not entirely equal in terms of the modalities of the sides involvement. Whereas today, especially after Vladimir Putin return to the Presidency, Russia -according to its multipolar world vision and its foreign policy identity -is persistently trying to establish its relations with the other centers of power in the world on the basis of the parity and equality principles and revises their agendas accordingly.
The US reaction to these Russian steps was remarkably constructive. Washington indicated it was ready to re-negotiate the relevant agreements with Moscow according to the rules and principles that Russia finds appropriate. Thus, the Obama Administration shows readiness to depart from the traditional notion of the US foreign policy towards Russia since the end of the Cold war, when Russian transformation according to the US values and preferences was regarded as a criteria and precondition for positive bilateral relations.
A strong indication of the US will to preserve positive and pragmatic cooperation with Russia in many areas despite mutual alienation and the December 2012 "mini-crisis" is its commitment to minimize the negative impact on the US-Russia relation of the unfriendly steps, undertaken towards Russia by the US Congress in the later months of December 2012. In particular, the Obama Administration has already made clear that its cooperation with Russia on the "helicopter package" will continue despite the legislative amendment demanding to cease this.
Administration will use the "national security exemption" to avoid implementing the Congressional demand. Also, it will do its best to minimize the negative impact of the Magnitsky Act by including all the sensitive figures into the "closed" list, non-transparent to the US
Congress.
However, the model of selective and pragmatic cooperation, which might be considered as the best among worst, still has a number of serious disadvantages.
First, allowing the model of pragmatic selective cooperation, the sides lose many opportunities to advance their objective national foreign economic and political interests through cooperation on a qualitatively new agenda. This agenda does not exist today, but could emerge given the current 17 challenges and opportunities that Russia and the USS face in the current international system.
The sides simply do not see these opportunities, for their identification and development requires designing and building cooperation on the issues quite new for the US-Russia relations, such as Asia Pacific, and this, in its turn, requires substantial political will and positive political atmosphere of the relations, which today is clearly absent. In the other words, the model of pragmatic selective cooperation narrows the sides' foreign policy visions, contributes to their sticking to the agenda of bilateral relations and the reading of national interests which are at least partly outdated in the current international conditions, and thus deprives them of many opportunities to advance their real interests and standing. Moreover, failing to cooperate on many issues where this cooperation is desirable in the given international system, the sides weaken their relative position to the other centers of power in the world and in the international system in general. In addition, the negative part of relations will grow bigger and can lead to a new round of confrontation farce between Russia and the United States in a couple of years. Afghanistan alone will not be enough to make up for such negative growth. In fact, as the two countries near the year 2014, when a large part of the American contingent is to pull out of the country, contradictions between Russia and the United States over Afghanistan will increase, and after 2014 this factor will completely lose its relevance as the backbone of the positive bilateral agenda.
Lastly, the development of the current "mini crisis" in U.S.-Russia relations into a drawn-out crisis with a possible across-the-board collapse in several more years will mean that the window of opportunity for building a sustainable U.S-Russian partnership during Obama's reign will close for an indefinite period of time. A new administration, most likely Republican, will hardly 20 pursue as favorable a policy with regard to Russia as the present one did or make relations with Moscow its key priority.
Diverging views on further nuclear arms cuts remains a separate problem in U.S.-Russia relations. Nuclear arms reduction and primarily Russia's numerical superiority in tactical nuclear weapons remain a key priority issue for Obama's second presidential term. Russia, being adherent to the classical understanding of strategic stability (which is based on strategic deterrence of Russia and the United States), strategic parity with America and overwhelming nuclear superiority over third countries, is clearly negative about a new round of nuclear arms cuts in the years to come.
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Russia says that a new round of nuclear arms cuts before New START is implemented would be premature. Moscow links them to the reduction and limitation of all other factors that influence strategic stability, primarily such troubling U.S. defense policy aspects as missile defense, the global blitzkrieg program and militarization of outer space. However, the nuclear capabilities of other countries are equally disturbing. By so doing Russia insists that the next hypothetical round of nuclear arms cuts be, first, multilateral rather than bilateral in nature, and, second, cover not only nuclear weapons but also other weapons that affect strategic stability. Clearly, such broadening does not appear feasible for the time being, and Moscow's linkages are designed to remove the issue of further reductions from the practical agenda in principle. A similar situation can be seen in the field of tactical nuclear weapons: as a precondition for talks, Moscow insists that the American tactical nuclear weapons remaining in Europe be withdrawn to the United States and links their reduction to the existing imbalance in conventional weapons with NATO.
Progress in this field is unlikely in the near future. Yet the suspension of cooperation in this area is completely justified from the point of view of strategic stability and stronger nuclear nonproliferation regime, and will most likely have a curative effect on bilateral relations.
Such a new deterioration of the relations and another repetition of the negative cycle of the USRussia relations would be of a profoundly artificial nature, unnecessary and harmful for the national interests and international standing of both countries.
First, it would contradict the fact that common challenges and, consequently, areas of parallel or coinciding interests of Russia and the US are more important for their long-term international standing, than their contradictions. These coinciding interests include: managing the peaceful rise of China and the power shift from the historical West to the new centers of power and the Asia Pacific in general; preventing pervasive chaotization and radical Islamization of the Broader Middle East; managing strategic stability in the era of nuclear multipolarity, preventing catastrophic terrorism and fighting nuclear proliferation. Failing to work on them, the US and Russian weaken their relative stance in the International System. 22 Second, it would breathe artificial life into those features and problems of the US-Russia relations, which are inherited either from the Cold War era or from the 1990-s as best, and look irrelevant in the current conditions. Among them are the continues dominance of the strategic deterrence paradigm in their security relations, the sides' sticking to the strategic parity as an organizing principle of their relations in the nuclear arms field, attempts to counterbalance each other in the strategic field and even geopolitical competition in the Post-Soviet space. Indeed, preserving strategic parity and deterrence as a foreign policy and security imperative is irrelevant when the Cold war is history, and the sides face fundamentally different security environments.
Similarly, attempt to impede the Russia-centric integration tendencies at the former USSR seems useless in conditions, where a new strategic rival to the US has already emerged in a different place, and the fate of the Post-Soviet region can not impact the future of the US international leadership and primacy in any way.
As a result, the logic and substance of the US-Russia relations will remain to be detached from the major tendencies of the International Relations and from the real challenges and opportunities that Russia and the US face in the world of today and tomorrow, thus undermining relative weight and competitiveness of each of the sides. Therefore, the main task facing U.S.-Russia relations in the coming months would be to improve the political atmosphere in relations, thus overcoming the current "mini crisis," and bring the strong commitment of the foreign policy and military-political leadership of the two countries to constructive and pragmatic cooperation to the top level of government in both Russia and the United States.
